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Codes as Straight-Jackets, Safeguards, and Alibis:
The Experience of the French Civil Code
Olivier

I.

Introduction: The Civil Code

Moreteaut
as a

Straight-Jacket?

Since 1 789, which marked the year of the French Revolution,
France has known no fewer than thirteen constitutions.1 This fact is
scarcely evidence of political stability, although it is fair to say that the
Constitution of 1958, of the Fifth Republic, has remained in force for
over thirty-five years.

On the other hand, t he Civil Code (Code),

which came into force in 1804, has remained substantially unchanged
throughout this entire period. It has been amended many times, espe
cially since the last war, to take into account t he equality of women and
to m odernize the law of divorce. However, many of its nearly 2,300
articles remain intact. Small wonder that it is sometimes referred to as
"the Civil Constitution"2-legal stability exists where political stability
has been lacking.
Lawyers in common law countries tend to consider the codified
civil law systems as restrictive and mechanical. The Code is seen as a
constraint, with judges obligated to make a mechanical application of
its provisions whenever a case arises which corresponds to the situation
described in the Code. Under such
"a sort of judicial slot machine. "3

a

conce ption, the court is seen as

t Maitre de conferences (Associate Professor), Faculte de droit, Universite Jean Mou
lin, Lyon 3, France; Associate Director, lnstitut de droit compare Edouard Lambert; Visiting
Prof essor, University of Minnesota Law School, fall 1992, and Boston University School of
1993 and 1994; Visiting Fellow, Kingston University. Doctorat d'Etat de droit,
3, France. An earlier version of this paper was presented to the
Faculty at the University of North Carolina School of Law, Chapel Hill, on September 30,
1994. I am indebted to Professor David Gruning, Loyola University School of Law, New

Law, fall

Universite Jean Moulin, Lyon

Orleans, Louisiana, for his· helpful comments, and to Stewart Newcombe, Barrister, Consult
ant to Etu de Chaine, notaries in Lyon, for his very precious contribution to the final version.

ber

1 S ix of the thirteen constitutions arose in the revolutionary period beLWeen Septem

3, 1791, and May 18, 1804, this last being the constitution whereunder Napoleon became

emperor. There have been four republican constitutions, two monarchial constitutions, and
one of January 14, 1852, whereunder Napoleon III became emperor.
2 P AUL DusoucHET, LA PENSEEjURIDIQUE AvANT ET APR.ts LE
3 See RoscoE POUND, THE SPIRIT oF THE CoMMON LAw 170-71

CODE CML 92 (1991).
(1921) ("As a critic has

put it, the theory of the codes in Continental Europe in the last century made of the court a
son of judicial slot machine. The n ecessary machinery had been provided in advance by
legislatio n or by received legal principles and one had but to put it in the facts above and
take out the decision below. True, this critic says, the facts do not always fit the machinery,
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There is no doubt that this presumption is wrong for most codes
in civil law countries. Certainly, it is not correct as far as the French
Civil Code is concerned, as that Code does not contain many detailed
provisions. True, a certain number of rather precise articles exist, for
example in the chapters on property, but most provisions are phrased
in the form of general rules. Moreover, these rules are succinct and
well written. Stendhal, one of the greatest writers of the 19th century,
expressed a deep admiration for the elegance and conciseness of the
French Civil Code.4

Consider the following example:

"An y act by

which a person causes damage to another makes the person b y whose
fault the damage occurred liable to make reparation of such damage."5
It is precisely in the law of tort that the difference in approach
between common law countries and the countries with codified sys
tems is so apparent. In the former countries, the courts look at each
case and apply legal principles extracted from precedents which they
themselves have created. In the latter, the courts have to apply general
principles enunciated by the legislature to a particular set of facts. Par
adoxically, although countries such as France claim to be the heirs of
Roman law, in fact in many ways the Roman lawyers used the case-by
case pragmatic approach of the common lawyers. 6 Nowhere is this
more apparent than in the case of the Roman law of tort, a point
which will be developed later.
The general principles are by no means confined to the law of
tort. The following examples are typical of the generality of the rules
to be found in other parts of the Civil Code:
Agreements leg ally entered into have the force of law for those who
have made them. They can only be revoked by their mutual assent, or
for causes that the law would allow. They must be performed in good
faith.7
Duress exerted against a party obliged unde r a contract nullifies the
contract, even when exerted by a third party.s
Duress exists whenever a reasonable person may be influenced by the
the fear of exposing his person or property to a substantial and pres
ent harm. The age, sex and condition of the person have to be taken
into account.9
[The sale] is perfect as between the partie s and property passes by l aw
and hence we �ay have to thump and joggle the machinery a bit in order to get anything
out But even m extreme cases of this departure from the purely automatic, the decision is
:
.
attnb ted, not a� �II to the thumpmg
and joggling process, but solely to the machine.").
.
When wntm� his famous novel, La Chartreuse de Pa1'71U, Stendhal used to read a few
. .
proV1s1ons every day m order to perfect his style. JAC UES GHESTIN & GILLES GousEAUX, I
Q
TRArrt. DE DRoIT CIVIL, IITTRooucnoN GE:NERALE 94 (2d ed. 1983) (citing letter from Sten
dhal to Balzac (Oct. 30, 1840)). In the 20th century, Jules Romain, in his celebrated play,
Knock, also recommended reading the Civil Code in order to fight insomnia. Id.
CODE CML [C. CIV.] art. 1382 (Fr.).
Set gmn-ally WILLIAM W. BucKU.No & ARNoLD D McNA.JR ROMAN LAw AND COMMON
U.w (1965).
7 C. CIV. art. 1134 (Fr.).
8 C. CIV. art. ll ll (Fr.).
9 C. CIV. art. 1112 (Fr.).

�

�
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to the buyer as against the seller, as soon as they have agreed on the
thing and on the price, even if the thing has not been delivered or the
price has not been paid. 10

The preceding list is by no means exhaustive, and is merely illustrative
of the general couching of terms within the Code. Perusing the Civil
Code, it soon becomes apparent that judges have wide discretion in
interpreting its provisions.

For example, in applying Article 1382 of

the Code, 11 the judge has to decide what the term "damage" means. Is

it limited to damage to the person or to property? Does it cover eco
nomic loss or mental suffering? The task of defining these terms is left
to the courts. Similarly, Article 1 1 1 1, 12 relating to duress in contract,
gives no precise definition of duress. The courts will have to decide
whether such things as economic duress are covered by the code provi
sion. The entire Code uses such general terms without giving a
definition.
The courts possess great freedom to interpret the Code as they
think fit. For instance, they can hold that the provisions of Article

1583, 13 which states that property passes by law to the buyer at the time
of the contract, does not create a mandatory rule but rather only ap
plies when parties have not otherwise stipulated.14 Unlike common
law

courts,

decisions

by

French courts

do

not

create binding

precendents, although decisions of the Cour de cassation (the court of
highest jurisdiction) do have persuasive authority.15
Given the relative flexibility of judges to interpret the general
terms in the Code, how then could we get the idea that codes are
straightjackets? Two reasons can be proposed.

The first reason is

comparative. Traditionally, lawyers in America, England, and other
common law countries regard the law as being made by the courts.
When faced with a very precise, concrete question, the judge responds
by applying a particular rule, which may be distinguished in a subse
quent case if the sitation in the latter case is slightly different. A legal
rule is therefore a precise rule. The legislative technique reflects this
conception. In common law countries, a statute has to deal with par
ticular problems with detailed provisions, therefore leaving little room
for judicial interpretation. Therefore, many people in common law
jurisdictions tend to regard the law in a codified system as rigid, be
cause they tend not to appreciate that the civil law legislature is con
tent with enunciating general principles and are thereby necessarily
lO c.
CIV. art. 1583 (Fr.).
11 C. CIV. art. 1382 (Fr.). See supra text accompanying note 5.
12
C. cw. arL 1111 (Fr.). See supra text accompanying note 8.
13 C. civ. arL 1583 (Fr.). See supra text accompanying note 10.
14 Judgment of June 26, 1935, Cass. req., 1935 D.H. 414 (Fr.); Judgment of Jan. 24,
1984, Cass civ. Ire, 1984 Bull. Civ. I, No. 31 (Fr.).
15 RENE: DAVID, FRENCH LAw, ITs STRucruRE, SouRcEs AND METHODOLOGY 179-86
(Michael Kindred trans., 1972).
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leaving a large margin for interpretation.16
law jurisdictions
The second reason is political. Lawyers in civil
should be create d by
traditionally insist that in a democracy, the law
from Montes
the representative s of the people. This idea comes
is the basis of
quieu's concept of separation of powers,17 an idea which
the French
of
time
the
since
France,
In
the American Constitution.
judges can
that
openly
admit
to
l
heretica
Revolution, it has remained
power.
ve
normati
some
be lawmakers or that they may have

French lawyers certainly admit the existence of something which

may be described as case law. They call it 'jurisprudence."18 Any stu
dent textbook or general introduction to the study of the law will ad
mit that while some rules may be created by judges, the legislator is the
only direct lawmaker.19 Jurisprudence (in the civil law sense of judge
made law) is always described as an indirect source of law.
In France, more than in any other civil law country, this remains
the prevailing ideology. French lawyers worship what they call "posi
tive law," the law created by the French legislator. Like Austinians,
they cannot dissociate the law from the authority of the State. 20 The
legislator alone has authority to create the law. When the judge is re
quired to fill a gap in the law, he has to find the support in the text of
the Code, and it should not be presumed that his ruling may be bind
ing. The judge contributes to the law, but does not create it.

As always, one has to look back to history to understand such an
attitude. Yet, this Article will have the effect of pointing out that the
Civil Code was actually meant to be a safeguard.

11.

Historical Perspective: The Civil Code as a Safeguard
The main purpose of the Code has been to unify the law of the

country. Its style shows that it was meant to be understood by the ordi16 Id. at 78. Da�d compares the
attitudes of the French and English lawyers with re
spect to the concepuon of legal rules. Id. He then goes on to explain that to an English
lawyer, the French legal rule "does not have the precision that is the essence of such a rule.
Rather, it is a legal principle." Id.
Cam 17. M0�ur�u, THE SPIRIT OF lliE LA"'.s 156-67 (Anne M. Cohler et al. eds. & trans.,
bndge University Press 1989). Montesqmeu, drawing from principles espoused by John
Locke, develo�d one of the cornerstone concepts of the American Consitution-separatio n
of powers. In his 1669 work, Fundamental Coruitutionsfor the Government or Carolina, which was
'J
wntten m Montesqu1eu ' s capacity as Secretary of the Lords
Proprietors of Carolina ' he set
forth the basic premises of the doctrine.
1 8 Th e term "juri
�prudence" as used in this context should not be confused with juris
. the
prudence m
Amencan and English sense of the term, which is more of a philos o p hical
concept.
19 &t, t.g.. BoRJs STARCK, INTRODUCTION AU DROIT 342-48 (Henri Roland
& Laurent
Boyer eds., 3d ed. 1991).
20 Ro oo uo SACCO, LA CoMPARAJ SON jURIDIQUE A
u SERVICE DE LA CoNNAISSANCE D u
DRorr 51-59 (1991) (illustrating how difficult it is
for lawyers to reconcile the fact that behind
authonty of the State, the nly lawmaker, many other forces
are at work, such as judges
?
law pr?fessors, that contnbute to the creation of
and
the law). See inl'ra
, .. notes 64-87
accompanying text.
·

�:�

·
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nary c1tlzen. Without denying a possible contribution by the judiciary,
the codifiers meant the Code to safeguard the citizens against any form
of judicial arbitrariness.
A.

The Purpose of the Code: Unification of the Law of the Country

During the centuries following the rise of the French monarchy,
the French kings strove to unify the country. When Hughes Capet21
was made king in 987, he only had direct jurisdiction over a very small
part of the kingdom, called the Domaine Royal. The Domaine Royal cov
ered n o more than a fifth of the country, mainly Paris and the "Ile de
France." Other provinces remained under the jurisdiction of very pow
erful local lords who kept fighting for independence. It took the skills
and the efforts of kings like Charles VII (with the help of Joan of Arc),
Louis XI, Francis I, Louis XIV, and Louis XV to impose a strong royal
power and the idea of a centralized State.
Yet, these kings never managed to impose a system of law on the
whole country. In France, unlike in England where a centralized sys
tem of royal courts soon imposed a common law,22 the judicial power
was not in the hands of royal judges. Justice was chiefly local. The
local parlements23 were sovereign courts of justice in their provinces,
and the Parkment de Paris did not control parlements in Bordeaux, Tou
louse, Aix-en-Provence, or Dijon.
The northern half of France remained a pays de coutume (a land of
customary law) with a mosaic of local customs, and the southern half a

pays de droit ecrit (a land o f written law) where the Roman law was
chiefly applied. A few major statutes ( ordonnances royaks) had been
promulgated during the reigns of Charles VII, Francis I, Louis XIII ,
Louis XIV, and Louis XV. The statutes, however, only achieved unifi
cation in some limited parts of the law, such as real estate, gifts, and
successions.24 However, even this limited unification paved the way
and indicated that: (I) legislation was the only possible way to unify
the law of the country; and (2) sound unification implied an accepta
ble compromise between customs and Roman law.
During the 18th century, under the influence of philosophers like
Voltaire and Rousseau, the French people came to realize that they
21 Capet was the founding king of the dynasty that ruled over the country for 800 years
until the time of the French Revolution i n 1789. See FRANCOIS OuvIER-MARTIN, H!SToIRE Du
DRoIT FRANCAIS DEs 0RIGINES A I.A RtvoLUTION (1948).
22

The term "common" refers to the fact that the law was common to the whole country.
This term should not to be confused with the English term parliament, which refers
to a governing legislative body.
24
By the Ordonnance de Montil-les-Tours of 1454, Charles VII ordained that the customs of
23

the various territories should be written down. KONRAD ZWEIGERT & HEIN Kon, Al< INTRO
oucr10N TO COMPARATIVE LAw

78 (1948).

This task was never completed, but it helped in the

development of a common customary law of France

(droit coutumier commun)

without which

the attempt to unify the law through codification would probably have been in vain.

78-79.

Id.

at
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ironic style, it was
were one nation. As Voltaire said in his well-known
d horses .25
change
he
absurd for a traveller to change law as often as
.
26
nation.
e
th
Legislation came to be seen as the mode of um"fying
l assemb ly
In 1791, the Constituent Assembly (the first nationa
a code
that
vote
us
nanimo
u
a
by
during the Revolution) decided
favor
not
did
on
Revoluti
the
should be drafted.27 Yet, the turmoil of
had
nothing
votes,
such a project. At the end of 1799, despite several
Consul,
been done in that respect.28 It took the genius of the first
ion and
Napoleon Bonaparte, to revive the spirit of the dying Revolut
a
to fulfill the project of a code. On August 13, 1800, he appointed
committee of four members to prepare the draft of a civil code which
would be discussed and voted on by the legislature.29

The idea was not new. The royal ordinances of Louis XIV and
Louis XV had already been prepared by specialized committees of
prominent jurists. But the energy and the genius of Napoleon, who
took a strong interest and a personal part in the realization of the pro
ject, made it possible to produce a comprehensive code within a very
short period of time: the whole code was e nacted in 1804.30
The members of Napoleon's committee, four prominent jurists
(Tronchet, Bigot-Preameneu, Maleville, and Portalis), actually repre
sented the two systems of customs and written law. Never did they
claim any intention to create a completely new system. They endeav
ored to use all their knowledge, experience, and wisdom to effect a
smooth transition between the past and the present so that the Code
could be a dual compromise between the laws of the North (customs)
and the South (Roman law), and between the ideas of the past and the
revolutionary ideal.
While in exile, Napoleon said: "My true glory is not that I have
won 40 battles; Waterloo will blow away the memory of these victories.
What nothing can blow away, what will live eternally, is my Civil
.
.
C
o de. "ll1 Th ere 1s a certam degree of truth in this emphatic statement.
_
.
Smee the time of the Revolution, France has had approximately fifteen
.
25 Voltai�e once said: "Is it not an absurd and terrible thing that what is true in one
.
Village is false m another? What kind of barbarism is it that citizens must live under differe nt
laws?
When you travel in this kingdom you change legal systems as often as you chang e
horses." Id. a t 8 .
·

·

·

26 See grnerally MONTESQUIEU, supra note 17.
For a standard treatise coveri ng t h e hist ory
of French law before the French Revolution, see FRANc;;
o1s OLMER-MARTIN, H1sro1RE ou
DROIT FRAN�S DES 0RJGINES A IA REVOLUTION
(1948). For a brief survey of this period, see
ZwtIGERT & Kon, supra note 24, at 76-86.
27 ZwtIGERT & K6TZ, supra note 24,
.
at 83 ("A code of civil law common to the whole
kingdom will be drawn up.").

: On the law of the revolutionary period (known as droit intermidiaire), see id. at 82-86.

Id. at 8�-86. See generallyjEAN-Lou1s HALPERIN, L'IMPOSSill
LE CooE CML (1992)
The vanous parts of the French Civil Code had been enacted
by way of thirty-six
separate statutes during the years 1803 and 1804.
The Code was re-enacted as a whole by the
La w of March 21, 1804.
·

30

.

31 Al am Levasseur, Cede Napoleon

or

Code P<malis�, 43 Tut. L. REv. 762, 764 (1969).
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constitutions, but has always kept its Civil Code, which has been de
scribed as the "civil constitution" of the country.32 Although it has
been amended many times, the structure and many portions remain
unchanged.

B.

The Styl,e

of

the Code: Legislating

for the

Ordinary Citizen

The style chosen by the drafters of the Code is an indication of
their intention to protect the citizen against the wrongful interference
of the judiciary. The drafters also intended it to b e non-technical. It is
almost free of the legal jargon often used by professionals to establish
their authority and protect their power. Like the text of a constitution,
it is meant to be understood by ordinary citizens, without the interfer
ence of verbose lawyers, who sometimes strive to make the law more
complicated than it really is.
I nterestingly, it is not so in all the civil law countries. The German
Civil Code, known in German as the Biirgeliches Gesetzbuch (BGB), is
by comparison a very technical text that only a professional lawyer can
understand. This is due to the fact that historically, the main authority
in German law was the professor. German law is based on a very so
phisticated analysis of Roman law sources, chiefly the Pandects, by far
the most comprehensive part of Justinian's Corpus Juris Civilis. Until
the time of Bismarck, there was not one Germany but a mosaic of small
States with their individual supreme courts.33

These supreme courts

used to refer to academic work in order to decide complicated cases.34
The BGB, which came into force on January

1, 1900,

almost

a

hundred years after the French Civil Code, is a pure product of the
work of scientists.35 It is full of complicated terms and abstract con
cepts. It contains a general part and some special parts, the latter to be
c onstrued on the background of the general part, resulting in hun
dreds of cross references.
This reference to the German experience is presented to show
that there is no single method for making civil codes.

The French

method is more the product of history than legal science.36 For all the
32

See supra text accompanying note 2.
Once the Holy Roman Empire of the Germanic Nation had been abolished in 1806,
the German Supreme Court (the Reichskammergmcht), which had been c reated in 1495,
ceased to exist. See Francis Deak & Max R heinstein, The Development of French and Gennan Law,
24 G EO. LJ. 551, 568-70 (1936) .
33

34 This tradition dated back to the Middle Ages, when judges used to refer to the "com
mon opinion of doctors" (opinio communis doctorum). See gmerally Helmut Coing, The Roman
Law as /us Commune on the Continent, 89 L.Q. REv. 505 (1973) (discussing the influence of

l�gal ed ucation during the Middle Ages in spreading Roman legal concepts throughout con
tinental Europe). For a general survey of the historical development of German law, see
ZWEIGERT & KoTZ, supra note 24, at 1 3 3-43. See also Deak & Rheinstein, supra note 33, at 56870.
35

See ZWEIGERT & K6TZ, supra note 24, at 150-51.
It ha s been retained or imitated inter alia in Belgium, The Netherlands, Italy, Spain,
Louisiana, Quebe c, and most Latin American countries. Id. at 100-22. On the other hand,
36
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reasons given, it retains the distinctive character of being a safeguard, a
"civil constitution" of the country. Its style makes it more comparable
to the American Constitution than to any U.S. statute.
It is worth noting that when the French Parliament introduces
amendments into the Civil Code, it tries to preserve the Code's origi
nal architecture and to draft the new provisions in the same, simple
style. If the new provisions are long and technical, then, despite the
fact that they refer to questions dealt with in the Code, they are placed
instead in auxiliary statutes. The Law of 1978 on consumer credit
agreements,37 the Law of 1985 on road traffic accidents,38 or the De
cree of 1955 relating to land registration39 are a few examples of such
auxiliary statutes. These auxiliary statutes, like the mass of French leg
islation enacted during the second half of this century,40 are often as
technical and detailed as American legislation.

C.

The Paradox of the Code: Trust or Distrust o f the judiciary?

Of course, as indicated above, the judge can play a more creative
role when applying the Civil Code than when construing these obscure
statutes. In fact, the Code's draftsmen intended judges to play just
such a role. For example, Portalis, the most prominen t of the four
drafters, was a political moderate, a fact made clear in the preliminary
speech he delivered to the Assembly charged with enacting the
Code.41 Portalis explained the two extremes that legislators should
avoid: oversimplification-"leaving citizens without rule or guarantee
concerning their greatest interests"42-and going too far into details
keeping "clear of the dangerous ambition of wanting to forecast and
regulate everything. "43 Indeed, "society's needs are so varied, the in
tercourse between them so active, their interests so manifold, and their
relations so extensive that the legislator cannot possibly provide for all
eventualities."44
Extremely detailed rules, it was thought, could not resist evolutio n
the German model has been imported in Greece, the former Soviet Union. Hungary. and
some other East m European countries. Id. at 159-60. Yet, many countries like Italy, Switzer
�
.
land, nd Austna are greatly mfluenced by German scholarship Id. at 153.
.
.
3 C. CIV. art. 1914 (94th ed. Pellts
Codes Dalloz 1994) (Fr.) (codifying L. No. 78-22 of
Jan. 10, 1978).

�

� C. CIV. art. 1384 (94th ed. Petits Codes Dalloz 1994) (Fr.) (codifying L. No. 85-677 of
5, 1985).
39 C. CIV. art. 2203 (94th ed.
Petits Codes Dalloz 1994) (Fr.) (codifying D. No. 55-22 of
Jan. 4, 1954).
July

40

These statutes are often consolidated in some very technical codes like the CooE

GtNtRAI. DES IMPOTS (Dalloz 1993) (Taxation Code) CODE DE LA
SECURITE SOCIALE (Dalloz
'
1994) (Social Security Code). CoDE DE L'URRANISME (Dalloz 1994) (Town Planning Code).
41 M. Schael Herman, Excerpts From A Discourse On the Code Napoleon By Porta
lis And Case
law And Doc_":'� By A. Esmrin, 18 Lov. L. REv. 23, 24-28 (1972).
See Levasseur, supra n ote 31,
at 76 -74 (c111ng excerpts translated by M. Shae(
Herman ).
2 Levasseur, supra note 31 ' at 769
4� Id.
41 Id.

J

.
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and would have to be amended too often, which creates insecurity.
According to Portalis, this is not what legislation ought to be:
The role of legislation is to set, by taking a broad approach, the gen
eral propositions of the law, to establish principles which will be fertile
in application, and not to get down to the details of questions which

may arise in particular instances. It is for the judge and the jurist,
imbued with
application. 45

the

general

spirit

of

the

laws,

to

direct

their

Turning to the method of interpretation, Portalis made a clear
distinction between the task of judges from that of legislators.
When the legislation is clear, it must be followed; when it is obscure,
we must carefully analyze its pro visions. If there is no particular enact
ment, custom or equity must be consulted. Equity is the return to
natural law, when positive Jaws are silent, contradictory, or obscure

46

Then, he made this magnificent statement:
There is a science for lawmakers, as there is for judges; and the former
does not resemble the latter. The legislator's science consists in find
ing in each subject the principles most favorable to the common good;
the judge's science is to put these principles into effect, to diversify
them, and to extend them, by means of wise and reasoned application,
to private causes; to examine closely the spirit of the Jaw when the
letter kills. 47

He c oncluded on the value of experience: "It is for experience gradu
ally to fill up the gaps we leave."48
It was therefore admitted that judges may contribute to the evolu
tion of the law by way of judicial interpretation. The judge is meant to
complement and update the work of the legislator.

But the text is

there, general but clear. It cannot easily be distorted, and it is there
fore a good safeguard.
The conception advocated by Portalis implied a certain degree of
trust placed in the ability of the judiciary. The j udicial reforms under
taken during the Revolutionary and Imperial periods justify such an
optimistic view. A centralized court system had been created, with a
supreme court at the top, the Gour de cassation, something France never
had before. And officially at least, judicial appointments were made
regardless of social and feudal privileges.
Yet, the French have never totally lost their prejudice towards the
judicial system, which they regarded, rightly, as subservient to an all
powerful ex ecutive. They have always been apprehensive that judicial
power might be abused. This fear, no doubt, arises from the judicial
abu ses inflicted on the French people under the Ancien Rigime. Even
today, French judges still enjoy little prestige or esteem. They are eas45 Id.
46
47
48

Id.
Id.
Id.

at
at
at

771.
772.
773.

[VoL.
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ily criticized both by the population and by p oliticians. They are n oth
ing but a special category of civil servants.
Prior to the Constitution of the Fifth Republic, which was enacted
on October 6, 1958, there was no judicial review of legislative power.
The Constitution of the Fifth Republic created a Constitutional Court

�

with very limited jurisdiction.49 Yet, when the Frenc constit':1tioi:ial
judges have attempted to develop a check on the exercise o f legislative
power,s0 their attempts are denounced as leading to potential govern
ment by judges.51
As a matter of fact, the French Constitution of 1958 prefers the
term autoriti judiciaire ("judicial authority") to that of
("judicial power").52

pouvoir judiciare

The latter term would parallel the American

terms legislative power and executive power. The word "authority" was
meant to be weaker than the term "power."53
For these reasons, despite the important powers vested in them,
judges have kept a low profile. During the 19th century, French judges
claimed to do an exegesis of the Code or, i n other words, they inter
preted the Code strictly. Exegesis as a technique of interpretation has
often been described in France as being a servile and literal interpreta
tion. This is not exactly true. Some brilliant comparatists54 and at
least one French scholar55 have provided evidence of the creative work
made by the so-called "Exegetical School" in the 19th Century.
49 FR. CoNST. arts. 56-63. When a statute has been passed, certain representatives of the
executive or the legislative branch may, before the promulgation of the statute, challenge its

constitutionality before the Omseil constitutionneL When held to be unconstitutional, the stat
ute i� ineffecti�e and cannot be promulgated. However, if no timely submission to the Conseil
am.st1tutltmntl 1s made, the statute is promulgated and its constitutionality cannot be ques
tioned by anyone before any court.
For an authorit .a_tive survey of this evolution leading to a more develope d system of
par le
JUd1cial reVlew, see Louis Favoreu, Le cimtrole de ccm.stitutionnaliti des nonne.s juridi ques
Omseil constitutionnt� 1987 REvuE FRAN�SE DE DRorr AoMINISTRATIF (R. FR. D. AoMIN.] 845.
im
51 In July and August 1993, the Conseil con.stitutiannel was called upon to review six

. . �o

.

portant statutes designed to enforce the newly appointed Balladur Government law and or
.
der pol�cy.
n Augu�t 13, 1993, the Conseil con.stitutiannel held that some provisions of a
statute imposing a stnct control of immigration were unconstitutional. The next d ay, Mr.
Charles Pasqua, the Minister of the Interior, declared on the television channel TF 1: "The
Omseil consti�utionntf m_ore and more rules according to expediency than according to the
great repubhcan pnnc1ples. As everyone may notice, there is a real drift. Yet, sovereignty
belongs to the people." Michel De Jaeghere, Minorite de blocage, 378 LE SPECTACLE ou MoNDE

�

10 (1993) (a press article presenting the conservative opinion that judges should not be

allowed to challenge the government policy once accepted by the representative of the
people).
Edouard Lambert, wh? in 19� 1 founded the Institute of Comparative Law at the Univer
·
.
s•ty of Ly on, expressed cnt.Jcal
Views of the U.S. Supreme Court's anti-progressive govem
.
ment by judges. Set gmerally EDOUARD LAMBERT, LE GoUVERNEMENT DES juGES ET LA LUTfE
CoNTRE v. Ltc1stATION Soc1ALE AUX ETATS-UN1s. L'ExPtRJENCE AMtRICAINE DU CoNTROLE

Ju01c1AIRE

DE lA CoNSTITUTIONNALrrt DES Lois (1921)
.
52 FR. CoNST. art. 64.
5' Ste PHILIPPE ARDANT, INSTITUTIONS PoLITIQUES E T DRorr CoNSTITUTIONNEL 586
(1991).
54 Set gmerally JoHN P. DAWSON, THE ORACLES OF THE LAw (1978) .
55 PhT
1 •ppe R.
emy , Eloge de l'txigist, REVUE DE LA REcHERCHEjURIDIQUE DROIT P ROSPECTIF
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The judges' work may look conservative, since they referred to
some old historical sources such as the

coutume

de Paris, royal ordi

nances, Roman law, texts of Domat,56 or Pothier (whose works in flu
enced the drafters a great deal).57 Yet, they also knew how to promote
a sound evolution, considering the law as a system and working on the
assumption that the Code declares rather than creates the law.58
During this period, judges had to keep a low profile and to act as
if everything they said naturally flowed from the provisions of the

Code, as if they were merely giving effect to the legislators' intention.
The fact that French judicial decisions contain no individual opinions,

but are a brief summary of the majority opinion, with virtually no refer
ence to the arguments presented, greatly assisted judges in maintain
ing the fiction that they were merely following the Code. It is enough
for the court of highest jurisdiction to state: "According to article 1384
paragraph 1, the law is thus." Such a statement gives everyone the im
pression that the solution is at least dwelling implicitly in the Code
provision. Such statements also made the shift to a more daring atti
tude possible.

III.

Modern Developments: The Civil Code as an Alibi
At the turn of the century, judges did much more than simply

keep alive the Code they revered. In order to circumvent some obso
lete rules and modernize the law, they did not hesitate to depart from
the obvious intention of the legislator and move away from traditional
principles supporting some Code provisions.

Nonetheless, they kept

paying lip ser vice to the Code, citing its provisions as the direct source
of their judgments. Such a use of provisions of the Code may be de
scribed as "legal fiction." Yet, in the present context, the word "alibi"
has been preferred:

When a c cused of departure from the text, the

judge can answer that he did not commit the crime of acting as a Iegis
lator59 but remained within the framework of the provision which was
cited.

A study of the development of the law of tort is particularly illus
trative. The law of tort is contained in five Articles of the Code, 1382
254 ( 1982). The best key towards the understanding of the law of that time is found in
CHRI STIAN AT!AS, EPJSrtMOLOGIEjURIDIQUE 21, 47 (1985).
56

57

LES LOIS CMLES DANS LEUR 0RDRE NATUREL (1689-1694).

Pothier's famous TRAirt DES OBLIGATIONS (1761)
Evans in 1806.
58
59

Remy, supra note 55, at 259-62.

was

translated into English by W.D.

Article 5 of the Civil Code states that "judges are forbidden, when giving judgement
the cases which are brought before them, to lay down general rules of conduct. . . ." C.
CIV. art. 5 (Fr.).
A judge who violated this prohibition was g uilty of a criminal offense. CooE
PEN
-:1' [C . PEN.] art. 127 (Fr.) (repealed by the new Penal Code which came into force on
Apnl 1, 1994). Article 5 was intended to prevent judges from returning to the old practice of
�aking arrets de riglement, i.e., stating in a judgment a general rule to be applied in forthcom
ing cases.
.
m
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to 1 386. As already stated, Article 1 382, which is the first and principle
Article of the Code relating to tort, is couched in very general terms. 60
m n
This part of the Code is inspired, not by the pr�gmatism of the
_ Ro_ �
lawyers but by the ideals of the 18th century philosophers, basmg liabil
ity in tort on the principle of moral responsibility. According to the
Civil Code, apart from a few exceptional cases where negligence was
presumed, liability in tort was clearly based on the idea of fault. Evi
dence had to be adduced that the damage had been caused by some
form of negligence .61
With the development of industrial m achinery, and the advent of
the railroad and the internal combustion engine, principles underly
ing the law relating to third-party liability became obsolete. For in
stance, was it reasonable to ask the worker/victim of a workplace
accident caused by a defective machine to prove, in order to recover
damages, that the accident had been caused by some fault or negli
gence of the employer? Was it fair to deny any remedy to the victim of
a road traffic accident who had been behaving carefully but had not
managed to convince a court that the driver had been negligent? Who
was to bear the risk of such casualties: the innocent victim or the one
who, by using the m achine, had created the risk?
Two solutions were possible. The firs t possibility was to ask the
legislator to intervene, but there was too much controversy surround
ing this option and the French legislators remained stubbornly pas
sive.62 The second solution was judicial, and, thanks to the creativity of
the French judiciary-assisted of course by imaginative academics
the legislature w a s allowed to sleep until 1985.63 In the meantime
some judicial solutions had been found in the law of contract a nd the
law of tort.

A.

Alibis in the Law of Contract

In modernizing personal injury law, the courts relied on the law of
cont�ac t whenever possible. If there was a contract of carriage between
.
the victim and the carrier, the contract was said to include an implied
C. crv. art. 1382 (Fr.); su sufrra note 5.
61 C. crv. arts. 1382-1383 (Fr.).
62 There were� few exceptions
to this passivity such as the Law of April 9, 1898, which
proVl. ed compensauon for workers who were victims of accidents suffered during the course
of their employment. This statute has been replaced by the Law of October 30, 1946, CooE
�Eu. s�cuRJTt SOCIALE art. L. 414 (Fr.), which provides for automatic but limited compensa
tion, thout any need t prove the employer's negligence.
6 In 985, the National Assembly
passed special legislation on road traffic accidents
.
which proV1ded for a scheme of automatic compensation. C. crv.
art. 1384 (94th e d. Petits
Co es Dalloz 1994) (Fr.) (codifying L. No. 85-677 of July 5, 1985). The provisio ns of this
.
auxiliary statute are far more detailed than that of the proposed
law of December 5, 1906 ,
hich purported to revise the text of C. crv. art. 1386 by adding two paragraphs. See ARTHUR
·VON MEHREN &JAMES R. GoRDLEY, THE CML LAw SYSTEM
625 (2d ed. 1977).
60

�

';1

�

�

�

�
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( obligation de securite') . 64 In th e

case of railroad transportation, the courts hesitated in deciding the
scope of this application.

I t could start when the passenger entered

the railroad station to buy h is ticket, or when h e eventually bough t his
ticket, and it would finish once he had left the station at the point of
arrival. I t could even be limited to only exist during the actual act of
transportation. Yet, even if it was fair to hold the carrier prima facie
liable in the case of a crash, it was too much to hold him liable for
breach of the safety obligation when the traveller had missed a step
when boarding the train .
Working on a distinction invented by a law professor,65 the con
tractual obligation could be of two kinds. The first type of contractual
obligation was an

obligation de risultat, which can be described as the

standard obligation to perform what is actually promised in the con
tract, in which case nonperformance gives a right to damages without
need to prove negligence. The second type of contractual obligation
was an

obligation de prudence et diligence, also known as an obligation de

mayens. 66

In this type of obligation, the promisor only undertakes a

duty of due care but is under no obligation to reach any particular
outcome. The aggrieved promisee has to prove negligence if he wants
to obtain damages. This second type of obligation is typically the one
found by judges in contracts between medical practitioners and their
patients. The victim of medical malpractice has a contractual action
but must prove negligence. The physician has a contractual duty to act
with reasonable care according to the present state of scientific knowl
edge, but is under no duty to heal the patient.67
Returning to railroad accidents, the courts ruled that the carrier's
obligation to carry the person safely was an

obligation de re'sultat begin

ning when the passenger boarded the train and ending when he had
stepped off. 68 When the accident happened inside the station, for in
stance on the platform, the carrier still owed a contractual obligation,
which was analyzed as an obligation de moyens. The victim therefore had
to prove the carrier's negligence.69
To avoid blurred disti n c tions as to the moment when the contrac
tual obligation was incurred, the courts eventually ruled that when the
accident h appened outside the scope of the contractual

obligation de

64 Judgment of Nov. 21, 1 9 1 1 (Compagnie generale transatlantique ) , Cass. civ., 1913
Recueil Dalloz [D. Jur. ) I 249 note L. Sarrut (Fr.).
65 RENE. DEMOGUE, 5 TRAirt DES OBLIGATIONS EN GENERAL § 1237 ( 1925) .
66 Id. For a detailed study, see generally JOSEPH FROSSARD, DE I.A DISTINCTION DES OBLI
GATIONS DE MOYENS ET DES OBLIGATIONS DE REsULTAT (1965).
67
Judgment of May 20, 1 936, Cass. civ., 1936 Recueil Dalloz [D.P. I) I 88 rapport
Josserand, Cone!. Matter, note E.P (Fr. ) .
68
Judgment of July 1,
G.C. M. (Fr. ) .
69 Judgment ofJuly 21,
Abadir (Fr. ) .

1969,

Cass. civ. I re,

1970,

Cass. civ. Ire,

1969

1970

Recueil Dalloz [D.

Jur.] 640

Recueil Dalloz [D. Jur.)

767

note

note R.

.
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resultat, for instance on the platform, before boarding the tr �in, or af
ter having stepped off, the carrier 's liability was in tort. This was the

case even if the passenger had already purchased his ticket. 70 T he con

tractual obligation

de mO'jens in rail transportation therefore can no

longer apply.
This evolution in the law is entirely judicial. The distinction be
tween obligation

de resultat and obligation

de rrwyens does not appear in

the Code. T he Cour de cassation, the court o f last resort in t he French
system, had to find some legislative support for the distinction . The
effort was necessary in order for the Court to be able to determine
whether, in the given circumstances, the court below had rightly de
cided that this obligation was an obligation de resultat or an obligation de

mO'jens.
It was easy to j ustify the obligation de resultat, which is the typical
contractual obligation. The court can resort to Art icle 1 1 47, w hich
provides :
The debtor is condemned, where this is appropriate, to the payment
of damages, whether for the non-performance of the obligation or for

delay in its performance, whenever he does not show that the non
performance results from an extraneous event which cannot be
71
puted to him, even though there is no bad faith on his part.

im

This is a general provision of the Code covering any contractual oblig a
tion, unless othe rwise agreed by the parties .
The legal alibi for the obligation de mayens was found in A rticle
1 1 37. According to t his Article, the obligation of looking after a t hing
one has been entrusted with requires the pe rson so obliged to exercise
the care of a "good family father"

( bon pere de Jamill.e or bonus paterjamil
ias) .72 Through a curious analogy, travellers and medical patients are

to be treated as well as things entrusted to bailees.
No French jurists would question t his distinction, since it is sup
ported by two articles in the Code. Its academic origin does not ap
pear in any judgment. Indeed, French courts only cite statutes. The
Co�� de cassati never makes any express reference to cases or to legal

°'!1'

wot.mg . Most mferior courts do likewise. French scholars are trained
to accept this practice73 and legal insiders will be able to trace t he aca
demic origin of t he new theories upheld by the courts anyway.74 How70 Judgment of Mar. 7, 1989 (Valverde v. S.N . C .F. ), Cass . civ. I re , 1991 Recueil Dalloz

[D. Jur.) 1 note Ph. Malaurie (Fr.) .

71 C. CJV. art. 1 1 47 (Fr.) .
. 72 C. CJV. art. 1 1 37 ( Fr.) . This is a standard inherited from Roman law; it is the
equivalent to the reasonable person in common law
countries.
.
73 The practice is radically different in Germany where books are commo n ly cited in
Judgments rendered by the courts of highest jurisdic
tion.
74 French legal periodicals such as REcUEIL DALLoz-S1REY LA SEMAINE JuRIDIQUE, LA
0
GAZE1TI. DU PALAis, usually publish judgments accompanied
by a note or commen t written by
a law professor a J'udge or a pracucmg
attorney. These notes proVlde mterestmg deta1·1s
wh'•ch can � ot be found in the very short majority
opinion. They refer to the non-legislative
sources which do not appear in the court decision.
Important Gour de cassation de cisions are
"

•

•

·

·

·
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ever, any rule of law applied by a court, regardless of whether it is
actually of academic origins, has to be presented as if it followed logi
cally from a legislative text.

B.

Alibis in the Law of Tort

When no contract exists between the victim and the defendant, a
solution had to be found in the law of torts. As indicated above, the
Code based liability on fault, which includes lack of care and negli
gence. 75 This is a general rule, to which the Code makes few excep
tions, the whole law of torts being contained in no more than five
articles. 76
Article 1 384 paragraph I provides: "A person is liable not only for

the damage he causes by his own act, but also for that caused by the
acts of a person for whom he is responsible or by things that he has
under his guard."77 This provision was designed to cover situations of
vicarious liability: of employers for torts committed by their employ
ees,78 parents' liability fo r their children,79 and the presumption that
damage caused by an animal80 or by the collapse of a building81 is due
to the negligence of its owner.
Gradually, the
cle 1 384 paragraph

Gour de cassation came to hold, on the basis of Arti
1 , that the guardian of a thing of any kind, not only

animals or buildings, is prima fade answerable for any damage caused
by the thing.82 Such stric t liability may be pleaded not only when the
damage comes from the thing itself (e.g., the explosion of a boiler) 83
but also when the thing is manipulated by a person (e.g., an accident
caused by a car in motion) . 84 The guardian, who was said by the

Gour

de cassation to be the person having the use, control, and direction of
the thing,85 can only be exonerated by proving force

majeure (i.e., that

often published together with the report prepared by one of the three or five (or sometimes
more) judges who have heard the case and/or with the comments made by the State Attor
ney (Procureur general or Avocat general) .
75 C. cw. arts. 1382-1383 (Fr. ) .
76 See C . cw. arts. 1382-1386 (Fr. ) .
7 7 C . CN. art. 1 384 para. I (Fr.) .
78 C. CN. art. 1384 para. 5 (Fr. ) .
7 9 C . cw. art. 1384 para. 4 (Fr.) .
8° C. CN. art. 1385 (Fr.).
8 1 c . CN. art. 1386 (Fr.).
82 Judgme
nt ofJan. 2 1 , 1 9 1 9 (Chemin de l'Ouest v. Marcault), Cass. civ., 1922 Recueil
Dalloz [D. Jur.] 1 25 note G. Ripert (Fr. ) . See VoN MEHREN & GoRDLEY, supra note 63, at 555702, which includes a translation of some of the cases and materials discussed in this section.
For a comprehensive discussion, see E.A. Tomlinson, Tort Liability in France for the Act of
Things: A Study ofjudicial Lawmaking, 48 LA. L. REv. 1 299 ( 1988) .
83 Id.

84 Judgme nt of Feb. 13, 1930 (Jand'heur v. Les Galeries belfortaises), Cass. ch. reun.,
1930 Recueil Dalloz (D. Jur.] I 57 note G. Ripert (Fr.) .
85 n a
I
famous case where t h e automobile that caused the damage had been stolen, the
Cour de cassation held that the owner nonetheless retained the guard of it. Judgment of Mar.
3 , 1 936 (Connot v. Franck), Cass. civ., 1 936 Recueil Dalloz [D. Jur.] I 81 note R. Capitant
(Fr. ) . The case was remanded to a Court of Appeal that refused to hold the owner liable.
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the damage was c aused by an irresistible, unforeseeable outside event)
or the contributory negligence of the vic tim.86
Many other refined distinctions have been developed, w i th no
more legal suppor t than Article 1 384 p a ragraph 1 . For instance, the
Gour de cassation paid lip service to Artic le 1 384 in deciding a case deal
ing with a building damaged by fire caused by the explosion of a televi
sion set. In tha t situation, the Court held the manufacturer and not
the owner of the se t liable, reasoning tha t i t was the manufacturer who
guards the structure of the appliance. On the other hand, if the dam
age was caused by a wrong use of the television set, the cour ts w ould
decide that the user is liable, because he has the "guard of the behav
ior" (garde du comportement) of the thing that caused the damage. Once
again the Code provision providing the a libi for either rule is Article
1 384.87
These interpreta tions are not necessarily wrong. They usually lead
to a fair result. These examples are i n te nded to show tha t French
judges are lawmakers and that the French Gour de cassation creates
precedents, even if such precedents only have persuasive authority.
But for the reasons set for th above, law making has to be done wi th an
alibi of some Code provisions .
Conclusion: Judges Can Go "Beyond the Code but Through

IV.

the Code"

To justify such departures from the ofte n obvious intention of the
legislature, academics came to say that one had moved to a modern
The Plenary Assembly of the Gour de cassation had to enter a final decision and this time held
that the guardian was the thief and not the owner, because the latter had lost control of it
and the former now had the use, the control, and the direction of the thing. Judgment of
D�c. 2, 1941 (Franck v. Cannot) , Cass. ch. reun., 1942 Recueil Dalloz [D.C. Jur.) 25 note G.
Ripen (Fr. ) .
86 The ontributory
negligence of the victim totally or partially exonerated the guard
�
.
ian of the �lu ng. Judgment of Sept. 9, 1940, Cass. civ. , 1 940 Recueil Dalloz [D.H. Jur. ] 1 41
(Fr.). Yet, m the Judgment ofJuly 21, 1982 (Desmares), Cass . civ. 2i:me, 1 982 Recue il Dallo z
[D. JUr.] 449 c ncl. Charbonnier and note Ch. Larroumet (Fr. ) , the Gour de cassation held
�
that �he VIcllm s fault could only exonerate the guardian when the result was unforeseeabl�
.
and insuperable. Th s
ffic acci
� . eory, extending the protection of the victims of road tra
dents, was strongly cntmzed. It was abandoned in 1 987 after the enactment of the Law No.
8S-677 ofJuly 22, 1 985, which created a system of auto atic compensation for victims of car
accidents. Judgment of Apr. 6, 1987 (Chauvet and Mettetal) , Cass . civ. 2eme, 1 988 Recueil
Dal loz [D.Jur.] 32 note Ch. Mouly (Fr.). The Gour de cassation then decided to move back to
the former theory. Jd.
87 Judgm�n.t of Nov. 30, 1 988, Cass. civ. 3e, 1 988 Bull. Civ. II, No. 240. Inspi red by Paul
A.·
Roubier, the distinction has been created by Berthold Colman
in his work DE LA D tTERMIN
DU GAROtEN REsPONSABLE DU FAIT DES CHOSES INANIMEES
( 1 947) . See also Andre Tune,
rae]du Comportement et gar<k <k la Structure dans la Responsabiliti du Fait des Cho es Jnanimies,
s
1 57 .C.P. I, No. 1 384.
T e distinction was first rejected by the Gour de cassation. Judgment of June 1 1 , 195 3,
_
civ. 2e , l954 Recue1l
Dalloz [D. Jur. ] 21 note R. Rodiere (Fr.). However, the distin ction
ate; upheld. J dgment of Nov. 12, 1975,
Cass. civ. Ire, 1976J.C.P. II, No. 1 8479 no te G.
';'
mey ( r. ) (explosion of a bottle of aerated water)
.

�
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method of interpretation. 88 When a provision is recent, the judge has
to explain it and look for the legislative inte n tion, wherever he may
find it. He applies the exegetical method in its traditional sense. Yet,
when the problem is new and the law was enacted at a time when the
problem could not be anticipated, the judge is free to take into ac
cou n t equity and policy elements and to act as a legislator. Still, h e
must keep within the framework of the Code.
At the beginning of the century, Saleilles put forth the magic
formula "au deld du Code civil, mais par le Code civil ": One has to go
beyon d the Code, but through the Code .89

To that extent, French

l awye rs are expert magicians.90 This phrase actually points out the
great paradox of the French attitude. The legislators should create all
rules, and the powers of the courts, which are considered untrustwor
thy, should be limited. Nevertheless, clear general rules continue to be
preferred to detailed enactments, at least in matters covered by the
Civil Code. So, let us allow the Cour de cassation to complement the
legislative work, provided that they conceal the purely doctrinal91 or
judicial origin of the rules they create and disguise it under the alibi of
some general Code provision.

They can find great support for such

actions in the old tradition of s tating the law in judgments shorter than
the headnote of a common law decision.

88 F
RANc;:ms GtNY, METHODES o'INTERPRETATION ET SouRcEs EN DROIT PRIVt Pos1TIF, ES
SAJ CRITIQUE ( 1899 .
)
8
9

PosmF

Raymond Saleilles,

( 1 9 13).

Preface to

FRANCOIS GtNY, ScrENCE ET TECHNIQUE

EN

DRorT PRIVE

90 Or legal priests of the next world, "Au-dew" meaning, when used substantively, the
hereafter." Saleilles, at the end of his Preface, insisted on the importance of the term "Au
deld," sayi ng that it should become the watchword of all jurists. Id.
"

91

I n Fre nch law, the word

doctrine

is used in the sense of legal writing.

